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Abstract: Socially inefficient payment for ecosystem services (PES) 
schemes result when adverse shifts in the provisioning of other ecosystem 
services (ES) or overpayment to service providers occur. To address these 
inefficiencies, a holistic evaluation of trade-offs between services 
should be conducted in parallel with determining land owners' service 
provisioning preferences. Recent evidence also suggests that nudging 
stakeholders' preferences could be a useful policy design tool to address 
global change challenges. Forest owners' landscape management preferences 
were nudged to determine the impact to social efficiency of PES schemes 
for biodiversity conservation and climate change mitigation in Finland. 
ES indicators for biodiversity conservation, carbon storage, and albedo 
impacts were included with traditional provisioning services (i.e. 
timber) and bioenergy to assess the consequent intra-service trade-offs. 
Synergies in provisioning of regulating services were identified, but 
were found to be more efficient when the management objective is for 
biodiversity conservation rather than climate change regulation. Nudging 
led to marginal gains in service provisioning above the baseline 
management and above neutral owner preferences, and increased aggregate 
service provisioning. This demonstrates the importance of considering 
intra-service trade-offs and that nudging could be an important tool for 
designing efficient PES schemes. 
 
Response to Reviewers: Reviewers' comments: 
 
Editor: While this is an interesting paper, there are issues of clarity 
of your arguments and English. Please make sure that these and the other 
reviewer’s comments are addressed in your revision. 
 
General comments to the editor and reviewers: 
 
We have taken the major comments that were given by both reviewers and 
made the requested major changes to our paper. The primary feedback 
centered on the lack of a cohesive argument to justify using trade-off 
analysis and nudging in the same paper. We agree that the argument was 
not clear in the original draft, and have made major changes to the 
introduction and the newly created discussion sections in an effort to 
clarify the methods purpose and the results (specifically those related 
to nudging). In doing so, it was necessary to make changes to the 
structure of the results section and have now added two new clearer 
tables to present the nudging outcomes. Due to restrictions of the 
journal regarding the number of figures/tables, it was necessary to move 
some of the original tables to the Supplementary materials. Additionally, 
based on feedback from the reviewers we have removed some of the analysis 
related to Eigen values from both documents. We have tried to provide 
reference to where the changes occurred, but due to some major edits it 
was not possible to be exact in all cases. 
 
Reviewer #1: Overall, an interesting paper. I like the idea of applying a 
behavioral psychological approach to influence stakeholder decision-
making in order to improve PES effectiveness by reducing programme 
inefficiencies, particularly policy costs, in conjunction with maximizing 
ecosystem service synergies by evaluating ES trade-offs. Nevertheless, I 
did find the article in several places difficult to work through and 
understand what was going on, a fact that I felt obscured the argument 
you're trying to make. In some cases I was also not convinced whether the 
'nudging' effect was actually significant. Therefore I have spelled out 
below some areas where I think the article could be strengthened and 
improved to make your narrative and argument more robust and convincing. 
 
Please see our general response to the reviewers and editor. 
 
Specific Comments: 
 
Due to the absence of page numbers and the non-continuous use of line 
numbers I have set the page on which the introduction starts as page 1. 
 
We have added page numbers and continuous line numbering for your 
convenience. 
 
Introduction 
 
Page 2 Line 6: It would be useful to define what you mean by bundling, as 
opposed to stacking for example, and its pros and cons. Also refer to 
some of the recent literature on bundling ES, for example: Turner et al., 
(2014) Landscape and Urban Planning 125, 89-104; Robertson et al., (2014) 
Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 12, 186-193; Simonit and 
Perrings (2013) PNAS 110, 9326-9331; Deal et al., (2012) Forest Policy 
and Economics 17, 69-76; Cooley and Olander (2011) Nicholas Institute for 
Environmental Policy Solutions Working Paper NI WP 11-04. 
 
We meant the stacking of ecosystem service offerings within a singular 
scheme rather than the stacking of credits for singular landscape/site. 
We have clarified this in the text and referred to the suggested 
articles. See lines 33-43 and 426-438. 
 
Page 2 Line 7: Refer also to Hejnowicz et al., (2014) who provide a 
capital asset approach to evaluate PES programme outcomes and improve 
scheme design (Hejnowicz et al., (2014) Ecosystem Services 9, 83-97). 
 
Done. See lines 41-43. 
 Page 2 Footnote 1: I presume you mean Engel et al., (2008) not (2010)? 
 
We have deleted this and many of the other footnotes. 
 
Page 3 Line 23: To my mind EU ETS is not a PES scheme, at least in the 
classical sense. I think at this point it is important to state what your 
underlying definition/criteria of a PES scheme is (i.e.is it Wunder's 
(2005) archetype or Pascual and Muradian's (2010) definition of a social 
transfer of resources?). Having then provided your criteria for what 
constitutes a PES design then state how the EU ETS and METSO II fit those 
criteria. At the moment it is not clear, and therefore it is not clear 
that you are comparing like for like. 
 
You are correct. Our benchmark scheme was the New Zealand ETS scheme for 
carbon offsets for private forest owners, which is based on the 
international price for carbon set by the EU ETS scheme. We consider that 
to be a PES scheme. Therefore, we use the EU ETS as our basis. However, 
we did not make reference to this link previously and appreciate the 
comment. We have now indicated this link more clearly in the 
introduction, removed reference to EU ETS, and clarified the definition 
of PES that we use within the introduction. See lines 74-84. 
 
Material and Methods 
 
Page 3 Line 54: Why were forests NOT growing on mineral soils excluded 
from your analysis? I would add this detail to ensure that your selection 
criteria are fully transparent. 
 
This has now been clarified. See lines 95-97. 
 
Page 4 Figure 1: I would suggest a smaller scale map would be much more 
useful and appropriate. I'm not sure I require to visualize the whole of 
Scandinavia just to contextualize your study area. 
 
The map has been moved to the Supplementary materials (Section 1) due to 
journal restrictions on the number of figures/tables. We have improved 
the map based on the other reviewer’s comments. 
 
Page 6 Table 1: Make sure the table is correctly formatted for the 
journal style. 
 
Based on a review of author guidelines and previous submissions, we 
believe that this style is appropriate for Elsevier. 
 
Page 7 Lines 29-35: This sentence is somewhat convoluted, simplify to 
express the meaning more clearly. 
 
We have rewritten this section to improve the clarity. See Section 2.5. 
 
Page 7 Lines 39-48: This section as a whole is not clearly formulated, it 
is not straightforward to understand what you are trying to convey, and 
would benefit from being reworded.  
 For example, with respect to lines 39-41, one interpretation could 
be that you're suggesting the degree of curvature for individual trade-
off curves represents the extent of a trade-off or synergy between 
individual indicators and a comparator (e.g., the correlation of 
indicators A, B,C, D, and E against F)? However, this may not be the 
case? Furthermore, in this section you also need to make clear what it is 
you mean by the term elasticities - remember your readership is going to 
be broad and so jargon may require explanation.  
 Secondly, for lines 42-46 would the following interpretation be 
correct: Management scenarios were applied to each site type and within 
each site type to each age class and covered a minimum of 10 hectares? 
Again, clarity in writing so what you're saying is not open to multiple 
interpretations. 
 Thirdly, line 46 may be better written as "Optimality was equated 
with the degree of economic return". 
 Fourthly, what do you mean by "attainable decision space"? 
 
We agree that the original version of the modeling section was very 
difficult to understand. We have worked to edit it in a manner that gives 
a better step-by-step representation of the modeling and the analysis of 
the results. Terms have now been better defined here or in the results 
section. Elasticities are defined within the text and we try to use less 
‘economic’ related jargon. We have tried to clarify ‘attainable decision 
space’. See Section 2.5. 
 
Page 7 line 54/55: Again, for clarity, I would suggest you state what you 
mean by "normalization" does this equate to "standardization"? 
 
No, this is a term used in Multi Criteria Decision Analysis to refer to 
the creation of a zero-one scale and not standardization. We have now 
referred to a specific chapter in a text that outlines this method and 
tried to clarify it in the text. See lines 253-258. 
 
Page 7 line 56/57: Replace zero-one with binary  
 
This change is not consistent with the idea of zero-one normalization, as 
we are scaling achievement of all criteria between zero and one (i.e. 
between the minimum possible and maximum possible), and not either zero 
or one. See lines 253-258. 
 
Page 8 Table 2: Ensure your table is correctly formatted 
 
The author guidelines say only that the tables should be in a word 
processing format.  
 
Page 10 line 32/33: Is this figure correct? Why would the subsidies for 
energy wood producers be assumed to be 0? 
 
I assume that you mean the value of 0 euros for the subsidy. We use this 
subsidy value on the basis that the current subsidies will no longer 
exist in the future and it has been an appropriate assumption, due to 
this uncertainty, made by other Finnish studies (i.e. Kallio et al. 
2011). See lines 179-186. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Page 11 line 43/44: Identify Figure C.7 in reference to Supplementary 
Information 
 
We have identified all of the relationships with the Supplementary 
Materials throughout the text. 
 
Page 11 lines 44-51: Suggested rephrasing to make this sentence clearer:  
"Thus provisioning (i.e., pulp wood, saw timber and bioenergy) and 
regulating (i.e., BIV, CS and RF) ES demonstrated similarly highly 
negative and elastic values at 100% economic returns. At 50% economic 
returns their respective elasticities were similarly negative but much 
smaller in magnitude." 
 
This is now rephrased in Section 3.1.  
 
Page 11 lines 51-52: Suggested rephrasing to make sentence clearer: 
"Except for saw timber and pulpwood ES indicators were strongly 
negatively correlated with economic returns." 
 
This has been rewritten in Section 3.1. 
 
Page 12 Table 3: Make sure your table is correctly formatted for the 
journal style. 
 
See response to previous similar comment. 
 
Page 12 Lines 37-42: Need to make it clear where these figures have been 
obtained from (i.e. Figure C.7 Supplementary Information) 
 
See response to previous similar comment. 
 
Page 12 line 52/53: Really? How did you arrive at this value? What 
particular values of the climate mitigation indicators are you 
correlating? If you compare one way of measuring an indicator with 
another way of measuring the same indicator isn't this just 
autocorrelation? 
 
This comment is extremely helpful and, we agree, there is a risk of 
autocorrelation if the same indicators are measured in different ways. 
However, for avoided radiative forcing we only include forcing from the 
albedo effect. This was not clear in the original manuscript and has now 
been clarified throughout the paper. This could be slightly confusing 
given that the avoided forcing from albedo effect and the carbon storage 
in forest biomass were stacked within the same PES scheme for climate 
change mitigation. We have tried to make this difference clear in 
Sections 2.3 (description of the indicators) and Section 3.1 (description 
of the trade-off results). 
 
Page 13 Table 4: Make sure table is correctly formatted for the journal 
style  
 
Page 14 Lines 9-11: Suggested rephrasing to improve sentence clarity: 
"Both CS and avoided RF were modestly positively correlated with BIV." 
 
This should have been “moderately”. 
 
Page 14 Lines 11-14: Need to reference Figure 2 in this sentence; 
otherwise it is unclear as to where your numbers are taken from. 
 
The figure has now been referenced. 
 
Page 14 line 14/15: In between "due" and "divergence" it should be "to a" 
rather than "a" 
 
This was rewritten. 
 Page 14 line 15/16: After "management activities" insert: (i.e., early 
harvesting and thinnings) 
 
Done. 
 
Page 14 lines 16-23: Remove the section that starts "These activities 
were" and ends "between CS and BIV", it is not necessary. 
 
This was rewritten. 
 
Page 14 merge lines 23-24/25 with line 33/34 so it now reads: 
"Both CS and RF reached perfect inelasticity with BIV at 50% BIV" 
 
This was rewritten. 
 
Page 14 lines 37/38 - 46/47: Start section 3.1 with this paragraph - get 
your message out up front and centre - and then use the proceeding 
paragraphs to justify and expand on this statement. 
 
The second reviewer has suggested separating the results and discussion. 
Thus, we do not know if this comment is still valid. 
 
Page 15 line 10/11: remove "of" after "summarizes" 
 
This was rewritten. 
 
Page 15 Table 5: Ensure that the table is formatted in the correct style 
for the journal 
 
See response to same comment above. 
 
Page 16 lines 20-31: Move to the beginning of section 3.2 and then 
discuss how your results enable you to address these challenges. 
 
The second reviewer has suggested separating the results and discussion. 
Thus, we do not know if this comment is still valid. 
 
Surely the main point to emphasise is that in both cases PES payments 
increased the LEV, so the question is which would be the better 
management option in each of the PES scenarios to adopt if you did not 
want to follow a BAU. Your opinion on this issue is not clear. 
 
You are correct. We have discussed this in the text on lines 475-489.  
 
Page 16 line 52: I would recommend starting section 3.3 with your 
assertion that nudging does make a difference and then present your 
evidence to convince the reader that this is the case. Beginning by 
describing a figure does not make for a strong narrative, nor is it a 
good way to present an argument. 
 
This has now been done. 
 
Page 16 line 55/56: Please identify the specific figure in Supplementary 
Information to which you are referring, in this case, I take it to be 
Figure C.8. 
 
This has been done for all references to the Supplementary Materials. 
 Page 16 line 59, Page 17 line 4: The difference between nudged and non-
nudged in Figure 3 appears to be minimal save for the CS case where 
differences are a little more obvious. Is the effect that you're 
registering really significant in terms of behaviour alteration? I don't 
find the evidence presented in Figure 3 all that convincing. I think you 
need to really make the case that these minor differences actually are 
significant from a behavioural point of view. 
 
It was not possible to test the significance in this paper, but related 
(published) research looking at the same research question with other 
stakeholder groups did find a significant result. We refer to that 
research in our current paper and discuss the relationship to this 
research. See lines 456-462. Also, we have changed from Fig. 3 to two 
tables (4 and 5) that better demonstrate the benefits of nudging. See 
section 3.3. 
 
Page 17 line 15: Euclidian distance: This section is not very clear. 
Suddenly we are discussing Euclidian distances and the argument for why 
is not explicitly presented, nor indeed is what this is actually a 
measure of and what this is evidence for at the end of the day. I think 
at the very least it is necessary to define what a Euclidian distance 
measure is, and why a term used in geometry has any bearing in this 
context, and furthermore, how you arrived at the numbers you included in 
the text. 
 
We have removed this from the paper. 
 
Page 18 lines 14-32: I would advise moving this segment to the beginning 
of section 3.3. 
 
Various sections were moved around to improve the flow of the paper. 
 
Page 18 line 48/49: The table you refer to here, which you've placed in 
Supplementary Information (i.e., Table C.9), would benefit from being 
inserted into the main text. After all, you're trying to make the 
argument that nudging works by reducing the inefficiencies in PES schemes 
(i.e., lowers costs) - here at least is presented some monetary figures 
that might support your claim in a more substantiated manner - much 
better than figure 3 which is not convincing. 
 
This comment has now been noted and we have exchanged the table and 
figure in Section 3.3. 
 
Page 19 lines 6-9: This sentence needs references. 
 
Done. See lines 450-453. 
 
Supplementary Material 
 
Table C.8 Please explain how you derived the summary information you 
present in this table, it is not altogether clear. 
 
This is now Table B.7 and we have briefly clarified what these values 
represent. They are the minimum and maximum values used in the 
normalization described in the text. 
 
 
Reviewer #2: Reviewer suggestion: Major revision. 
 
General comments: 
 
English syntax is very inaccurate and makes the article very difficult to 
follow and to understand. It needs to be reviewed in terms of grammar and 
in terms of enunciation to make it clearer and understandable. It makes 
also very difficult to follow the sequence of argumentation and the 
general comprehension of the manuscript. 
 
In this regard, it is also confusing the fact that the discussion is part 
of results. It makes results more difficult to identify and confuses the 
general comprehension of the manuscript. The results need to be clear and 
concise and isolated from the discussion section that is currently 
inexistent. The section 3.4. on limitations is somehow too short and 
naïve, and discusses aspects that are too far from the focus of the paper 
that should be on the validity of the model in real life, e.g. the fact 
that nudging is solely done with 10 forest owners, the fact that 
biodiversity indicators are extrapolated from existing coarse 
biodiversity modelling, how results would apply to other parts of Finland 
and to other social groups etc. 
 
Overall, the paper contains valuable data and treats an interesting 
subject, but it fails to justify the conclusions that are announced in 
the abstract. The effect of nudging of ES is not clearly understood by 
the reader and the organization of the manuscript, plus English syntax, 
makes the overall manuscript in need of major revisions before it can be 
reassessed for publication. I further indicate below the sentences that I 
found problematic for the validity of this research piece. 
 
We have made major edits to the paper in an effort to clarify the results 
and discussion sections. Based on these changes some of the edits noted 
below may no longer be valid. See our general comments to reviewers and 
the editor. 
 
-Abstract: 
"Environmental pressures on land use have increased interest in the 
provision of ecosystem services regulating climate change and 
biodiversity." Although just an introductory sentence in the abstract, 
the authors should also consider the increased importance for human 
health. 
 
The abstract has been rewritten.  
 
-1. Introduction: 
"The concept of nudging refers to the design of a choice architecture in 
a way that alters human behavior predictably without forbidding options 
or changing economic incentives (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008)." Unclear. 
 
This has been changed. See lines 55-57. 
 
"We adopt a trade-off approach…": What justifies the use of trade-offs in 
combination with nudging? 
 
A trade-off analysis demonstrates the potential social inefficiencies in 
how ecosystems are managed and payment schemes are designed. The aim of 
nudging is to increase social efficiency of PES schemes, but nudges could 
produce adverse trade-offs between schemes or service offerings. 
Therefore, we believe that it is necessary to assess trade-offs. We have 
more clearly justified this throughout the text, and given further 
references regarding the inclusion of trade-off analysis with other 
evaluations (i.e. analysis of trade-offs and bundling of multiple ES). 
 
"The ES include: carbon storage, avoided radiative forcing, biodiversity 
conservation, and commodity production." Commodity production is not and 
ES. 
 
We have now clarified this in the text. See section 2.3. 
 
-2.1. Description of the case area:  
"The grid dimensions were 20 x 20 m and only grid points containing 
forest growing on mineral soil were considered." Why and what other types 
of soils exhist? 
 
We have now clarified this in the text. See lines 95-97. 
 
Figure 1: The map, as it stands right now -using Google data-, is too 
basic and not useful. 
 
Erase and replace by another one doing a zoom at the 20x20km zone, and 
showing distribution of different forests, land uses and location of 
stakeholders. If it is not possible to do such map, then it is better to 
have no map than the current one. 
 
The map has been changed and moved to the Supplementary materials 
(Section 1) due to journal restrictions on the number of figures/tables. 
 
-2.2. Forest Management Scenarios:  
"Also, NIPF owners do not always follow the economically optimal 
rotation." Why and which ones? This sentence has a different font size as 
if it was included later in the writing process and not fully integrated 
in the text. 
 
This sentence was part of the original writing process. However, there 
are many authors and it was a formatting error that was, unfortunately, 
not caught prior to submission. It has now been fixed. Also, the sentence 
has now been clarified and a citation to support it has been added. 
 
-2.3. Forest Owner Consultation: 
"They were designed on a purely verbal basis.": What does this sentence 
mean? 
 
"The aim of nudging…": Nudging should be a but more developed and 
explained in the introduction. 
 
"In the consultation…": Why was this area selected? Why were this forest 
owners selected? Why only ten? Is it a sufficient number? 
 
These issues have now been clarified. See Section 2.4.  
 
-2.4. Multi-criteria decision analysis:  
"Each plan is a set of…": How are the five scenarios used to set a 
management plan? The combination of concepts is very confuse. 
 
"Landscape management portfolios…": Why this choice? 
 
"Optimality was based…": Unclear meaning. 
 
"Nudged and non-nudged groups…": Unclear meaning. 
 
"Normalization, using two…": Again, very obscure explanation. 
 
"For the trade-offs…": Very difficult to understand. Rephrase in a more 
simple and comprehensive way. 
 
This section was overall unclear, and we have tried to address the lack 
of clarity through extensive editing. We have defined the noted elements 
and expanded the explanation of the modeling/analysis processes. Now 
‘nudged and non-nudged’ is referred to as nudged and neutral. Hopefully 
this is now clearer. See Section 2.5. 
 
Table 2: 'Percent of total forest landscape' is a bad English 
formulation. 
 
The wording of the table header has now been adjusted. See Table 1. 
 
-2.5. Indicator variables: 
 
Economic returns is a not a 'scientifically-based criteria'? 
 
The aim had been to note that economic returns were calculated based on 
the marginal achievement of the various other indicators. However, the 
wording was not clear and it has now been adjusted. We have also tried to 
be more precise in noting the associations between the indicators chosen 
and the ecosystem service classifications. See our rephrasing in Section 
2.3. 
 
"All non-economic indicators…": Inaccurate English and understanding of 
additionality. Additionality is the change that takes place as a result 
of program implementation, and that would not have happened without the 
program. 
 
This is also our understanding of additionality. Thus, this is a clarity 
issue and we have tried to address it by adjusting the sentence in lines 
149-150. 
 
"It was then transformed…": Is this an annex or Supplementary 
information? I think that this equation should be in the main text. 
 
This is a very common equation in climate sciences for transforming 
radiative forcing to CO2 equivalent units (similar to basic discount 
formulas or financial ratios). Therefore, we do not feel it is necessary 
to include it in this text. See Section 2 in the Supplementary Materials. 
 
"The price for energy wood…": Why adding the EU ETS offset on coal-based 
energy? The price of energy wood depends on production costs and 
intersection between offer and demand. 
 
Coal-based energy producers need to purchase EU ETS to be able to emit 
carbon in Finland. Therefore, EU ETS are a cost of coal energy 
processing. This is the justification for the inclusion in the formula 
and has been used previously used in other studies. See lines 179-186. 
 
"A starting price of…": We need a more recent figure. In 2015, prices 
could have changed a lot. 
 
This comment is not completely clear. By ‘starting price’ we mean that 
this is the lowest price that we use in our study. We use this lower 
‘starting’ price on the basis of expectations about future prices within 
the carbon offset market. Other studies (i.e. Kallio et al., 2011) also 
suggest this is an appropriate lower price for EU ETS in the future. 
Based on the recent changes in the market structure at the governance 
level, we still feel that this is an appropriate lower price. Finally, 
this program is not based on a specific current price. It is based on the 
expected price over the next 50 years. Therefore, we do not feel that it 
is necessary to make this change to the input data. See lines 179-188. 
 
"Additionality was not considered…": This is a short coming of the 
existing PES program. Is it justified to maintain it in the current 
simulation? The sentence appears unclear to me. 
 
It is a shortcoming of that scheme. We included additionality in our 
calculations, but it is not possible to create new input data. We still 
feel that it is justified to use this input data on the basis of data 
availability and the efforts we have made to account for additionality in 
our calculations. 
 
-3. Results and discussion: 
 
"Regulating and provisioning ES…": How are ES measured here? €/ha? 
Units/ha? Unclear. Unclear also why they mention the exclusion of PES 
returns. 
 
This sentence has now changed. However, the units are available in the 
methods section. The indicators were all normalized so that they could be 
compared across various indicators with different units of measurement. 
We felt that the inclusion of units might also be confusing given that 
normalization removes the need for units. See Sections 2.3 and 3.1. 
 
"Given that the yield…": Global in terms of the Earth? 
 
This has been rewritten in Section 3.1.  
 
"Thus, provisioning and regulating…": Unclear sentence. 
 
This has been rewritten in Section 3.1. 
 
"Therefore a reduction in…": It is difficult to show or accept this 
partial conclusion when the reader does not clearly understand what type 
of biodiversity modelling allows asserting this. 
 
The biodiversity modeling was based on a scorecard approach that is 
clarified in the Supplementary materials. This accounting method for 
biodiversity was verified as part of the TNV scheme, which forms part of 
the European Union’s Natura2000 network. It is also scientifically 
acceptable and has been used in numerous peer-reviewed publications (i.e. 
Juutinen and Ollikainen, 2010; Juutinen et al., 2013; Primmer et al., 
2013; Juutinen et al., 2014). The aggregate indicator from the scorecard 
calculations, referred to as BIV in this article, was assessed on the 
basis of the TNV scheme’s scorecard for each of the scenarios in this 
study. This was done following the principle of additionality outlined in 
the text. The resulting value was then normalized and the Pareto optimal 
solutions were modeled to determine the trade-off between the aggregate 
biodiversity conservation value and all the other indicators and economic 
returns.  
 
"The elasticities indicated…": Inaccurate phrasing, makes very difficult 
to understand the scientific meaning of the sentence. 
 
We have clarified the meaning in lines 298-300 and 321-325. 
 
Table 5: These payments are only including CO2 prices. What about 
biodiversity? 
 
Both have now been included in the presented results. Previously they 
were found in the Supplementary Materials. 
 
"PES programs present an opportunity…": This para follows a discussion 
style. As previously suggested, it would be better to have an independent 
discussion section. 
 
We have created a separate discussion section. 
 
"In Fig. 3a-d…": What does "considerations..." exactly mean? 
 
We have removed this figure and replaced it with two tables. 
 
"NIPF owners in both…": Why? That maybe means that their actual returns 
are before the economic return that was modelled. 
 
It might mean that. It could also mean that even without being nudged, 
the forest owners had not previously considered alternative management 
objectives until the consultation. Therefore, relative to the baseline 
management they were willing to accept a loss after the consultation. See 
lines 463-470. 
 
Fig. 3: These figures do not clearly illustrate how nudging improves PES 
efficiency. 
 
We have now created two tables instead. 
 
"Nevertheless, there were…": Discussion style better fit in a discussion 
independent section. 
 
There is now a separate discussion. 
 
-3.4. Limitations: 
 
The way nudging was applied and how it influenced trade-offs is not 
clearly understood once the reader ends the manuscript. 
 
We have addressed this limitation in the discussion section. See lines 
457-507. 
 
  
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
We are re-submitting this article “Nudging service providers and assessing service trade-offs to 
reduce the social inefficiencies of Payments for Ecosystem Services schemes” for further review and 
publication in Environmental Science and Policy following major revisions made to the paper. Thank 
you for the opportunity to further edit this paper. 
We have taken both reviewers’ comments into account. The text should now be more cohesive 
and conclusions clearer. To address the reviewer’s primary concerns, we have now clarified our 
methods, presented our results using clearer tables, and included a broader discussion on the 
implications of our findings. Further responses to specific questions can be found in the responses to 
reviewers. 
 
Sincerely, 
Brent D. Matthies, Corresponding Author 
Cover Letter
  
Reviewers' comments: 
 
Editor: While this is an interesting paper, there are issues of clarity of your arguments and English. 
Please make sure that these and the other reviewer’s comments are addressed in your revision. 
 
General comments to the editor and reviewers: 
 
We have taken the major comments that were given by both reviewers and made the requested 
major changes to our paper. The primary feedback centered on the lack of a cohesive argument 
to justify using trade-off analysis and nudging in the same paper. We agree that the argument 
was not clear in the original draft, and have made major changes to the introduction and the 
newly created discussion sections in an effort to clarify the methods purpose and the results 
(specifically those related to nudging). In doing so, it was necessary to make changes to the 
structure of the results section and have now added two new clearer tables to present the nudging 
outcomes. Due to restrictions of the journal regarding the number of figures/tables, it was 
necessary to move some of the original tables to the Supplementary materials. Additionally, 
based on feedback from the reviewers we have removed some of the analysis related to Eigen 
values from both documents. We have tried to provide reference to where the changes occurred, 
but due to some major edits it was not possible to be exact in all cases. 
 
Reviewer #1: Overall, an interesting paper. I like the idea of applying a behavioral psychological 
approach to influence stakeholder decision-making in order to improve PES effectiveness by reducing 
programme inefficiencies, particularly policy costs, in conjunction with maximizing ecosystem service 
synergies by evaluating ES trade-offs. Nevertheless, I did find the article in several places difficult to 
work through and understand what was going on, a fact that I felt obscured the argument you're trying 
to make. In some cases I was also not convinced whether the 'nudging' effect was actually significant. 
Therefore I have spelled out below some areas where I think the article could be strengthened and 
improved to make your narrative and argument more robust and convincing. 
 
Please see our general response to the reviewers and editor. 
 
Specific Comments: 
 
Due to the absence of page numbers and the non-continuous use of line numbers I have set the page on 
which the introduction starts as page 1. 
 
We have added page numbers and continuous line numbering for your convenience. 
 
Introduction 
 
Page 2 Line 6: It would be useful to define what you mean by bundling, as opposed to stacking for 
example, and its pros and cons. Also refer to some of the recent literature on bundling ES, for example: 
Turner et al., (2014) Landscape and Urban Planning 125, 89-104; Robertson et al., (2014) Frontiers in 
Ecology and the Environment 12, 186-193; Simonit and Perrings (2013) PNAS 110, 9326-9331; Deal 
et al., (2012) Forest Policy and Economics 17, 69-76; Cooley and Olander (2011) Nicholas Institute for 
Environmental Policy Solutions Working Paper NI WP 11-04. 
 
*Response to Reviewers
  
We meant the stacking of ecosystem service offerings within a singular scheme rather than the 
stacking of credits for singular landscape/site. We have clarified this in the text and referred to 
the suggested articles. See lines 33-43 and 426-438. 
 
Page 2 Line 7: Refer also to Hejnowicz et al., (2014) who provide a capital asset approach to evaluate 
PES programme outcomes and improve scheme design (Hejnowicz et al., (2014) Ecosystem Services 9, 
83-97). 
 
Done. See lines 41-43. 
 
Page 2 Footnote 1: I presume you mean Engel et al., (2008) not (2010)? 
 
We have deleted this and many of the other footnotes. 
 
Page 3 Line 23: To my mind EU ETS is not a PES scheme, at least in the classical sense. I think at this 
point it is important to state what your underlying definition/criteria of a PES scheme is (i.e.is it 
Wunder's (2005) archetype or Pascual and Muradian's (2010) definition of a social transfer of 
resources?). Having then provided your criteria for what constitutes a PES design then state how the 
EU ETS and METSO II fit those criteria. At the moment it is not clear, and therefore it is not clear that 
you are comparing like for like. 
 
You are correct. Our benchmark scheme was the New Zealand ETS scheme for carbon offsets 
for private forest owners, which is based on the international price for carbon set by the EU ETS 
scheme. We consider that to be a PES scheme. Therefore, we use the EU ETS as our basis. 
However, we did not make reference to this link previously and appreciate the comment. We 
have now indicated this link more clearly in the introduction, removed reference to EU ETS, and 
clarified the definition of PES that we use within the introduction. See lines 74-84. 
 
Material and Methods 
 
Page 3 Line 54: Why were forests NOT growing on mineral soils excluded from your analysis? I would 
add this detail to ensure that your selection criteria are fully transparent. 
 
This has now been clarified. See lines 95-97. 
 
Page 4 Figure 1: I would suggest a smaller scale map would be much more useful and appropriate. I'm 
not sure I require to visualize the whole of Scandinavia just to contextualize your study area. 
 
The map has been moved to the Supplementary materials (Section 1) due to journal restrictions 
on the number of figures/tables. We have improved the map based on the other reviewer’s 
comments. 
 
Page 6 Table 1: Make sure the table is correctly formatted for the journal style. 
 
Based on a review of author guidelines and previous submissions, we believe that this style is 
appropriate for Elsevier. 
 
  
Page 7 Lines 29-35: This sentence is somewhat convoluted, simplify to express the meaning more 
clearly. 
 
We have rewritten this section to improve the clarity. See Section 2.5. 
 
Page 7 Lines 39-48: This section as a whole is not clearly formulated, it is not straightforward to 
understand what you are trying to convey, and would benefit from being reworded.  
 For example, with respect to lines 39-41, one interpretation could be that you're suggesting the 
degree of curvature for individual trade-off curves represents the extent of a trade-off or synergy 
between individual indicators and a comparator (e.g., the correlation of indicators A, B,C, D, and E 
against F)? However, this may not be the case? Furthermore, in this section you also need to make clear 
what it is you mean by the term elasticities - remember your readership is going to be broad and so 
jargon may require explanation.  
 Secondly, for lines 42-46 would the following interpretation be correct: Management scenarios 
were applied to each site type and within each site type to each age class and covered a minimum of 10 
hectares? Again, clarity in writing so what you're saying is not open to multiple interpretations. 
 Thirdly, line 46 may be better written as "Optimality was equated with the degree of economic 
return". 
 Fourthly, what do you mean by "attainable decision space"? 
 
We agree that the original version of the modeling section was very difficult to understand. We 
have worked to edit it in a manner that gives a better step-by-step representation of the modeling 
and the analysis of the results. Terms have now been better defined here or in the results section. 
Elasticities are defined within the text and we try to use less ‘economic’ related jargon. We have 
tried to clarify ‘attainable decision space’. See Section 2.5. 
 
Page 7 line 54/55: Again, for clarity, I would suggest you state what you mean by "normalization" does 
this equate to "standardization"? 
 
No, this is a term used in Multi Criteria Decision Analysis to refer to the creation of a zero-one 
scale and not standardization. We have now referred to a specific chapter in a text that outlines 
this method and tried to clarify it in the text. See lines 253-258. 
 
Page 7 line 56/57: Replace zero-one with binary  
 
This change is not consistent with the idea of zero-one normalization, as we are scaling 
achievement of all criteria between zero and one (i.e. between the minimum possible and 
maximum possible), and not either zero or one. See lines 253-258. 
 
Page 8 Table 2: Ensure your table is correctly formatted 
 
The author guidelines say only that the tables should be in a word processing format.  
 
Page 10 line 32/33: Is this figure correct? Why would the subsidies for energy wood producers be 
assumed to be 0? 
 
  
I assume that you mean the value of 0 euros for the subsidy. We use this subsidy value on the 
basis that the current subsidies will no longer exist in the future and it has been an appropriate 
assumption, due to this uncertainty, made by other Finnish studies (i.e. Kallio et al. 2011). See 
lines 179-186. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Page 11 line 43/44: Identify Figure C.7 in reference to Supplementary Information 
 
We have identified all of the relationships with the Supplementary Materials throughout the text. 
 
Page 11 lines 44-51: Suggested rephrasing to make this sentence clearer:  
"Thus provisioning (i.e., pulp wood, saw timber and bioenergy) and regulating (i.e., BIV, CS and RF) 
ES demonstrated similarly highly negative and elastic values at 100% economic returns. At 50% 
economic returns their respective elasticities were similarly negative but much smaller in magnitude." 
 
This is now rephrased in Section 3.1.  
 
Page 11 lines 51-52: Suggested rephrasing to make sentence clearer: 
"Except for saw timber and pulpwood ES indicators were strongly negatively correlated with economic 
returns." 
 
This has been rewritten in Section 3.1. 
 
Page 12 Table 3: Make sure your table is correctly formatted for the journal style. 
 
See response to previous similar comment. 
 
Page 12 Lines 37-42: Need to make it clear where these figures have been obtained from (i.e. Figure 
C.7 Supplementary Information) 
 
See response to previous similar comment. 
 
Page 12 line 52/53: Really? How did you arrive at this value? What particular values of the climate 
mitigation indicators are you correlating? If you compare one way of measuring an indicator with 
another way of measuring the same indicator isn't this just autocorrelation? 
 
This comment is extremely helpful and, we agree, there is a risk of autocorrelation if the same 
indicators are measured in different ways. However, for avoided radiative forcing we only 
include forcing from the albedo effect. This was not clear in the original manuscript and has now 
been clarified throughout the paper. This could be slightly confusing given that the avoided 
forcing from albedo effect and the carbon storage in forest biomass were stacked within the same 
PES scheme for climate change mitigation. We have tried to make this difference clear in 
Sections 2.3 (description of the indicators) and Section 3.1 (description of the trade-off results). 
 
Page 13 Table 4: Make sure table is correctly formatted for the journal style  
 
  
Page 14 Lines 9-11: Suggested rephrasing to improve sentence clarity: 
"Both CS and avoided RF were modestly positively correlated with BIV." 
 
This should have been “moderately”. 
 
Page 14 Lines 11-14: Need to reference Figure 2 in this sentence; otherwise it is unclear as to where 
your numbers are taken from. 
 
The figure has now been referenced. 
 
Page 14 line 14/15: In between "due" and "divergence" it should be "to a" rather than "a" 
 
This was rewritten. 
 
Page 14 line 15/16: After "management activities" insert: (i.e., early harvesting and thinnings) 
 
Done. 
 
Page 14 lines 16-23: Remove the section that starts "These activities were" and ends "between CS and 
BIV", it is not necessary. 
 
This was rewritten. 
 
Page 14 merge lines 23-24/25 with line 33/34 so it now reads: 
"Both CS and RF reached perfect inelasticity with BIV at 50% BIV" 
 
This was rewritten. 
 
Page 14 lines 37/38 - 46/47: Start section 3.1 with this paragraph - get your message out up front and 
centre - and then use the proceeding paragraphs to justify and expand on this statement. 
 
The second reviewer has suggested separating the results and discussion. Thus, we do not know if 
this comment is still valid. 
 
Page 15 line 10/11: remove "of" after "summarizes" 
 
This was rewritten. 
 
Page 15 Table 5: Ensure that the table is formatted in the correct style for the journal 
 
See response to same comment above. 
 
Page 16 lines 20-31: Move to the beginning of section 3.2 and then discuss how your results enable you 
to address these challenges. 
 
The second reviewer has suggested separating the results and discussion. Thus, we do not know if 
this comment is still valid. 
  
 
Surely the main point to emphasise is that in both cases PES payments increased the LEV, so the 
question is which would be the better management option in each of the PES scenarios to adopt if you 
did not want to follow a BAU. Your opinion on this issue is not clear. 
 
You are correct. We have discussed this in the text on lines 475-489.  
 
Page 16 line 52: I would recommend starting section 3.3 with your assertion that nudging does make a 
difference and then present your evidence to convince the reader that this is the case. Beginning by 
describing a figure does not make for a strong narrative, nor is it a good way to present an argument. 
 
This has now been done. 
 
Page 16 line 55/56: Please identify the specific figure in Supplementary Information to which you are 
referring, in this case, I take it to be Figure C.8. 
 
This has been done for all references to the Supplementary Materials. 
 
Page 16 line 59, Page 17 line 4: The difference between nudged and non-nudged in Figure 3 appears to 
be minimal save for the CS case where differences are a little more obvious. Is the effect that you're 
registering really significant in terms of behaviour alteration? I don't find the evidence presented in 
Figure 3 all that convincing. I think you need to really make the case that these minor differences 
actually are significant from a behavioural point of view. 
 
It was not possible to test the significance in this paper, but related (published) research looking 
at the same research question with other stakeholder groups did find a significant result. We 
refer to that research in our current paper and discuss the relationship to this research. See lines 
456-462. Also, we have changed from Fig. 3 to two tables (4 and 5) that better demonstrate the 
benefits of nudging. See section 3.3. 
 
Page 17 line 15: Euclidian distance: This section is not very clear. Suddenly we are discussing 
Euclidian distances and the argument for why is not explicitly presented, nor indeed is what this is 
actually a measure of and what this is evidence for at the end of the day. I think at the very least it is 
necessary to define what a Euclidian distance measure is, and why a term used in geometry has any 
bearing in this context, and furthermore, how you arrived at the numbers you included in the text. 
 
We have removed this from the paper. 
 
Page 18 lines 14-32: I would advise moving this segment to the beginning of section 3.3. 
 
Various sections were moved around to improve the flow of the paper. 
 
Page 18 line 48/49: The table you refer to here, which you've placed in Supplementary Information 
(i.e., Table C.9), would benefit from being inserted into the main text. After all, you're trying to make 
the argument that nudging works by reducing the inefficiencies in PES schemes (i.e., lowers costs) - 
here at least is presented some monetary figures that might support your claim in a more substantiated 
manner - much better than figure 3 which is not convincing. 
  
 
This comment has now been noted and we have exchanged the table and figure in Section 3.3. 
 
Page 19 lines 6-9: This sentence needs references. 
 
Done. See lines 450-453. 
 
Supplementary Material 
 
Table C.8 Please explain how you derived the summary information you present in this table, it is not 
altogether clear. 
 
This is now Table B.7 and we have briefly clarified what these values represent. They are the 
minimum and maximum values used in the normalization described in the text. 
 
 
Reviewer #2: Reviewer suggestion: Major revision. 
 
General comments: 
 
English syntax is very inaccurate and makes the article very difficult to follow and to understand. It 
needs to be reviewed in terms of grammar and in terms of enunciation to make it clearer and 
understandable. It makes also very difficult to follow the sequence of argumentation and the general 
comprehension of the manuscript. 
 
In this regard, it is also confusing the fact that the discussion is part of results. It makes results more 
difficult to identify and confuses the general comprehension of the manuscript. The results need to be 
clear and concise and isolated from the discussion section that is currently inexistent. The section 3.4. 
on limitations is somehow too short and naïve, and discusses aspects that are too far from the focus of 
the paper that should be on the validity of the model in real life, e.g. the fact that nudging is solely done 
with 10 forest owners, the fact that biodiversity indicators are extrapolated from existing coarse 
biodiversity modelling, how results would apply to other parts of Finland and to other social groups etc. 
 
Overall, the paper contains valuable data and treats an interesting subject, but it fails to justify the 
conclusions that are announced in the abstract. The effect of nudging of ES is not clearly understood by 
the reader and the organization of the manuscript, plus English syntax, makes the overall manuscript in 
need of major revisions before it can be reassessed for publication. I further indicate below the 
sentences that I found problematic for the validity of this research piece. 
 
We have made major edits to the paper in an effort to clarify the results and discussion sections. 
Based on these changes some of the edits noted below may no longer be valid. See our general 
comments to reviewers and the editor. 
 
-Abstract: 
"Environmental pressures on land use have increased interest in the provision of ecosystem services 
regulating climate change and biodiversity." Although just an introductory sentence in the abstract, the 
authors should also consider the increased importance for human health. 
  
 
The abstract has been rewritten.  
 
-1. Introduction: 
"The concept of nudging refers to the design of a choice architecture in a way that alters human 
behavior predictably without forbidding options or changing economic incentives (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008)." Unclear. 
 
This has been changed. See lines 55-57. 
 
"We adopt a trade-off approach…": What justifies the use of trade-offs in combination with nudging? 
 
A trade-off analysis demonstrates the potential social inefficiencies in how ecosystems are 
managed and payment schemes are designed. The aim of nudging is to increase social efficiency 
of PES schemes, but nudges could produce adverse trade-offs between schemes or service 
offerings. Therefore, we believe that it is necessary to assess trade-offs. We have more clearly 
justified this throughout the text, and given further references regarding the inclusion of trade-
off analysis with other evaluations (i.e. analysis of trade-offs and bundling of multiple ES). 
 
"The ES include: carbon storage, avoided radiative forcing, biodiversity conservation, and commodity 
production." Commodity production is not and ES. 
 
We have now clarified this in the text. See section 2.3. 
 
-2.1. Description of the case area:  
"The grid dimensions were 20 x 20 m and only grid points containing forest growing on mineral soil 
were considered." Why and what other types of soils exhist? 
 
We have now clarified this in the text. See lines 95-97. 
 
Figure 1: The map, as it stands right now -using Google data-, is too basic and not useful. 
 
Erase and replace by another one doing a zoom at the 20x20km zone, and showing distribution of 
different forests, land uses and location of stakeholders. If it is not possible to do such map, then it is 
better to have no map than the current one. 
 
The map has been changed and moved to the Supplementary materials (Section 1) due to journal 
restrictions on the number of figures/tables. 
 
-2.2. Forest Management Scenarios:  
"Also, NIPF owners do not always follow the economically optimal rotation." Why and which ones? 
This sentence has a different font size as if it was included later in the writing process and not fully 
integrated in the text. 
 
This sentence was part of the original writing process. However, there are many authors and it 
was a formatting error that was, unfortunately, not caught prior to submission. It has now been 
fixed. Also, the sentence has now been clarified and a citation to support it has been added. 
  
 
-2.3. Forest Owner Consultation: 
"They were designed on a purely verbal basis.": What does this sentence mean? 
 
"The aim of nudging…": Nudging should be a but more developed and explained in the introduction. 
 
"In the consultation…": Why was this area selected? Why were this forest owners selected? Why only 
ten? Is it a sufficient number? 
 
These issues have now been clarified. See Section 2.4.  
 
-2.4. Multi-criteria decision analysis:  
"Each plan is a set of…": How are the five scenarios used to set a management plan? The combination 
of concepts is very confuse. 
 
"Landscape management portfolios…": Why this choice? 
 
"Optimality was based…": Unclear meaning. 
 
"Nudged and non-nudged groups…": Unclear meaning. 
 
"Normalization, using two…": Again, very obscure explanation. 
 
"For the trade-offs…": Very difficult to understand. Rephrase in a more simple and comprehensive 
way. 
 
This section was overall unclear, and we have tried to address the lack of clarity through 
extensive editing. We have defined the noted elements and expanded the explanation of the 
modeling/analysis processes. Now ‘nudged and non-nudged’ is referred to as nudged and neutral. 
Hopefully this is now clearer. See Section 2.5. 
 
Table 2: 'Percent of total forest landscape' is a bad English formulation. 
 
The wording of the table header has now been adjusted. See Table 1. 
 
-2.5. Indicator variables: 
 
Economic returns is a not a 'scientifically-based criteria'? 
 
The aim had been to note that economic returns were calculated based on the marginal 
achievement of the various other indicators. However, the wording was not clear and it has now 
been adjusted. We have also tried to be more precise in noting the associations between the 
indicators chosen and the ecosystem service classifications. See our rephrasing in Section 2.3. 
 
"All non-economic indicators…": Inaccurate English and understanding of additionality. Additionality 
is the change that takes place as a result of program implementation, and that would not have happened 
without the program. 
  
 
This is also our understanding of additionality. Thus, this is a clarity issue and we have tried to 
address it by adjusting the sentence in lines 149-150. 
 
"It was then transformed…": Is this an annex or Supplementary information? I think that this equation 
should be in the main text. 
 
This is a very common equation in climate sciences for transforming radiative forcing to CO2 
equivalent units (similar to basic discount formulas or financial ratios). Therefore, we do not feel 
it is necessary to include it in this text. See Section 2 in the Supplementary Materials. 
 
"The price for energy wood…": Why adding the EU ETS offset on coal-based energy? The price of 
energy wood depends on production costs and intersection between offer and demand. 
 
Coal-based energy producers need to purchase EU ETS to be able to emit carbon in Finland. 
Therefore, EU ETS are a cost of coal energy processing. This is the justification for the inclusion 
in the formula and has been used previously used in other studies. See lines 179-186. 
 
"A starting price of…": We need a more recent figure. In 2015, prices could have changed a lot. 
 
This comment is not completely clear. By ‘starting price’ we mean that this is the lowest price 
that we use in our study. We use this lower ‘starting’ price on the basis of expectations about 
future prices within the carbon offset market. Other studies (i.e. Kallio et al., 2011) also suggest 
this is an appropriate lower price for EU ETS in the future. Based on the recent changes in the 
market structure at the governance level, we still feel that this is an appropriate lower price. 
Finally, this program is not based on a specific current price. It is based on the expected price 
over the next 50 years. Therefore, we do not feel that it is necessary to make this change to the 
input data. See lines 179-188. 
 
"Additionality was not considered…": This is a short coming of the existing PES program. Is it 
justified to maintain it in the current simulation? The sentence appears unclear to me. 
 
It is a shortcoming of that scheme. We included additionality in our calculations, but it is not 
possible to create new input data. We still feel that it is justified to use this input data on the basis 
of data availability and the efforts we have made to account for additionality in our calculations. 
 
-3. Results and discussion: 
 
"Regulating and provisioning ES…": How are ES measured here? €/ha? Units/ha? Unclear. Unclear 
also why they mention the exclusion of PES returns. 
 
This sentence has now changed. However, the units are available in the methods section. The 
indicators were all normalized so that they could be compared across various indicators with 
different units of measurement. We felt that the inclusion of units might also be confusing given 
that normalization removes the need for units. See Sections 2.3 and 3.1. 
 
"Given that the yield…": Global in terms of the Earth? 
  
 
This has been rewritten in Section 3.1.  
 
"Thus, provisioning and regulating…": Unclear sentence. 
 
This has been rewritten in Section 3.1. 
 
"Therefore a reduction in…": It is difficult to show or accept this partial conclusion when the reader 
does not clearly understand what type of biodiversity modelling allows asserting this. 
 
The biodiversity modeling was based on a scorecard approach that is clarified in the 
Supplementary materials. This accounting method for biodiversity was verified as part of the 
TNV scheme, which forms part of the European Union’s Natura2000 network. It is also 
scientifically acceptable and has been used in numerous peer-reviewed publications (i.e. Juutinen 
and Ollikainen, 2010; Juutinen et al., 2013; Primmer et al., 2013; Juutinen et al., 2014). The 
aggregate indicator from the scorecard calculations, referred to as BIV in this article, was 
assessed on the basis of the TNV scheme’s scorecard for each of the scenarios in this study. This 
was done following the principle of additionality outlined in the text. The resulting value was 
then normalized and the Pareto optimal solutions were modeled to determine the trade-off 
between the aggregate biodiversity conservation value and all the other indicators and economic 
returns.  
 
"The elasticities indicated…": Inaccurate phrasing, makes very difficult to understand the scientific 
meaning of the sentence. 
 
We have clarified the meaning in lines 298-300 and 321-325. 
 
Table 5: These payments are only including CO2 prices. What about biodiversity? 
 
Both have now been included in the presented results. Previously they were found in the 
Supplementary Materials. 
 
"PES programs present an opportunity…": This para follows a discussion style. As previously 
suggested, it would be better to have an independent discussion section. 
 
We have created a separate discussion section. 
 
"In Fig. 3a-d…": What does "considerations..." exactly mean? 
 
We have removed this figure and replaced it with two tables. 
 
"NIPF owners in both…": Why? That maybe means that their actual returns are before the economic 
return that was modelled. 
 
It might mean that. It could also mean that even without being nudged, the forest owners had not 
previously considered alternative management objectives until the consultation. Therefore, 
  
relative to the baseline management they were willing to accept a loss after the consultation. See 
lines 463-470. 
 
Fig. 3: These figures do not clearly illustrate how nudging improves PES efficiency. 
 
We have now created two tables instead. 
 
"Nevertheless, there were…": Discussion style better fit in a discussion independent section. 
 
There is now a separate discussion. 
 
-3.4. Limitations: 
 
The way nudging was applied and how it influenced trade-offs is not clearly understood once the reader 
ends the manuscript. 
 
We have tried to address this limitation in the discussion section. See lines 457-507. 
  
Highlights 
Two PES schemes were evaluated for social efficiency improvements. 
Nudging ecosystem service providers’ preferences led to social efficiency gains for both PES schemes. 
Nudging resulted in additional service provision above the Business-as-usual forest management. 
Trade-off analysis demonstrated the importance of management objectives in achieving equitable 
service provisioning.  
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“Nudging service providers and assessing service trade-offs to reduce the social inefficiencies of 1 
Payments for Ecosystem Services schemes” 2 
Abstract 3 
Socially inefficient payment for ecosystem services (PES) schemes result when adverse shifts in the 4 
provisioning of other ecosystem services (ES) or overpayment to service providers occur. To 5 
address these inefficiencies, a holistic evaluation of trade-offs between services should be 6 
conducted in parallel with determining land owners’ service provisioning preferences. Recent 7 
evidence also suggests that nudging stakeholders’ preferences could be a useful policy design tool 8 
to address global change challenges. Forest owners’ landscape management preferences were 9 
nudged to determine the impact to social efficiency of PES schemes for biodiversity conservation 10 
and climate change mitigation in Finland. ES indicators for biodiversity conservation, carbon 11 
storage, and albedo impacts were included with traditional provisioning services (i.e. timber) and 12 
bioenergy to assess the consequent intra-service trade-offs. Synergies in provisioning of regulating 13 
services were identified, but were found to be more efficient when the management objective is for 14 
biodiversity conservation rather than climate change regulation. Nudging led to marginal gains in 15 
service provisioning above the baseline management and above neutral owner preferences, and 16 
increased aggregate service provisioning. This demonstrates the importance of considering intra-17 
service trade-offs and that nudging could be an important tool for designing efficient PES schemes.   18 
Key Words 19 
Payment for ecosystem services; Social efficiency; Trade-off; Nudging; Ecosystem service 20 
1. Introduction 21 
Changes in landscape utilization decisions, intended to increase the provisioning of regulating 22 
ecosystem services (ES), are shaped by numerous social, economic, and environmental pressures 23 
resulting from competing objectives and trade-offs (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; 24 
Heller and Zavaleta, 2009; Salafsky, 2011; McShane et al., 2011; Howe et al., 2014). Policy makers 25 
should avoid allocating all of the realized opportunity costs from these shifts to private land owners 26 
in an effort to maximize social well-being. Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are one policy 27 
measure designed to address this misallocation by making socially desirable practices profitable for 28 
private land owners (Pagiola, 2005; Engel et al., 2008). Still, socially inefficient schemes emerge 29 
when service providers are paid more than the social value of the services or when socially-30 
undesirable land uses are incentivized leading to adverse intra-service trade-offs (Engel et al., 31 
2008). To avoid creating these socially efficient schemes careful policy design is required. 32 
Recent research has demonstrated that there are a number of different approaches for dealing 33 
with socially inefficient PES scheme design. Chan et al. (2006), Howe et al. (2014) and others 34 
recommend that a holistic trade-off analysis be adopted to account for provisioning synergies 35 
between different ES, which can be used to address potential overpayment by a given PES scheme 36 
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(Pagiola, 2005; Carpenter et al., 2009; Obersteiner et al., 2010). This can lead to the ‘stacking’1 or 37 
‘bundling’ of complementary ES, those with connectedness or interdependence in provisioning, 38 
within a singular PES scheme, which aims to reduce the risk adverse intra-service trade-offs by 39 
incentivizing co-provisioning of service offerings at socially efficient levels (Simonit and Perrings, 40 
2013; Turner et al., 2014). Engel et al. (2008) and Hejnowicz et al. (2014) also note that selectively 41 
targeting service providers an important approach for reducing costs and social inefficiency, and 42 
ensuring additionality within a PES scheme. 43 
Still, if forest owners’ preferences change over the course of the PES scheme, the resulting 44 
‘ideal’ targeted service providers could temporally and spatially shift. Additionally, when 45 
stakeholder preferences are considered, trade-offs between regulating and provisioning ES 46 
frequently favor the latter and often lead to human-centric normative judgments
2
 (Rantala and 47 
Primmer, 2003; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Margolis and Naevdal, 2007; Rockström et al., 2009). 48 
Consequently private management preferences can result in socially sub-optimal levels of ES, but 49 
excluding stakeholders from the planning phase may also reduce the viability of the policy (Gregory 50 
and Keeney, 1994; Chan et al., 2007; Bennett et al., 2009; McShane et al., 2011).  51 
Dickinson et al. (2013) have recently proposed framing stakeholder consultations to nudge their 52 
preferences as an alternative, and potentially important, tool for designing policies intended to 53 
generate greater action on climate change mitigation (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Moser and 54 
Dilling, 2007; Sussman, 2009; Huutoniemi and Hukkinen, 2014). The concept of nudging refers to 55 
a way of influencing people’s choices (i.e. about forestry management) without forbidding choice 56 
options or changing the economic feasibility of the alternatives (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). We 57 
propose that nudging stakeholder preferences should also be considered as an additional tool for 58 
improving the social efficiency of PES; particularly in cases where forest ownership is private and 59 
fragmented across a large number of owners, as in southern Finland. By considering stakeholder 60 
preferences, we assume that future forest management shifts are not certain and that the PES 61 
schemes’ success relies on acceptance by key stakeholders.  62 
We surveyed Finnish non-industrial private forest (forest) owners to determine their ES 63 
provisioning preferences for their regional forested landscape. Half of the forest owners in the 64 
                                                          
1
 Stacking is defined here as the bundling or stacking of multiple connected or interdependent ecosystem service 
offerings within a singular PES scheme, and not credit stacking that refers to many ecosystem service offerings being 
sold in multiple PES schemes for the same site (Robertson et al., 2014). 
2
 Ecosystem services are defined here as an aspect of a given ecosystem that is utilized, passively or actively, in the 
production of human well-being (Fisher et al., 2009).  
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survey were nudged to evaluate the potential of this policy tool for improving the social efficiency 65 
of PES schemes. Forest owners were presented with management scenarios for business-as-usual, 66 
bioenergy, climate change mitigation, and biodiversity conservation objectives, and the associated 67 
expected economic returns. The economic returns included compensation for management shifts 68 
away from the BAU for two different PES schemes. The PES schemes were evaluated using six ES 69 
indicators, following Mönkkönen et al.’s (2014) methods for forested landscape planning, to 70 
determine if: the ES trade-offs led to adverse impacts on the provisioning of non-targeted ES, the 71 
considered PES price levels resulted in overpayment for service provisioning, or the nudging of 72 
forest owners led to increased marginal service provisioning relative to the baseline. 73 
Climate change mitigation and biodiversity conservation form two of the foremost 74 
environmental pressures involved in forested landscape management planning (i.e. Carpenter et al., 75 
2009; Anderson et al., 2011). Therefore, the two PES schemes were targeted towards those non-76 
traditional forest management objectives. We define PES as a voluntary transaction for a well-77 
defined ES with at least one buyer and one service provider meeting the conditionality principle 78 
(service provider secures service provision) based on the definition provided by Wunder (2007). 79 
Using that definition, the climate PES scheme was based on the New Zealand Emissions Trading 80 
Scheme (ETS) (Jiang et al., 2009) that uses the international carbon offset price to determine forest 81 
owner compensation, and the biodiversity PES scheme was based on the existing Finnish 82 
governments’ METSO II conservation scheme that uses private bids for service provisioning 83 
contracts (Juutinen et al., 2013). 84 
2. Material and methods 85 
2.1. Description of the Case Area 86 
In Finland, 52% of forest land is under private ownership and supplies 80% of the harvested 87 
wood volume for industrial uses. As such, Finland provides a suitable example of challenges in 88 
aligning forest owner’s management preferences with the preferences of society. In the study area, 89 
forest ownership accounted for 73% of active forest management (FSYF, 2011). Stand inventory 90 
data for a 20 x 20 km square area around the Hyytiälä Forestry Field Station in southern Finland 91 
was provided by the Natural Resources Institute Finland from the Multi-Source National Forest 92 
Inventory (MS-NFI). The data contained land and forest site types and biometric information 93 
(Tomppo et al., 2008). Grid points containing forest growing on mineral soil or on ditched 94 
peatlands of same fertility were considered. Other peat soil sites (bogs, swamps etc.) containing 95 
trees constituted only a small proportion of the total area (3.2%), and were excluded from the 96 
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analysis. Forests were classified based on Finnish forest site types including: fertile Oxalis-97 
maianthemum and Oxalis-myrtillus (OMT), medium fertile Myrtillus (MT), and less fertile 98 
Vaccinium (VT) (Cajander, 1949). These three site types were divided according to six initial stand 99 
age classes: 0, 20, 45, 70, 90, and 120 years. All of the scenarios considered a mixture of native 100 
boreal species: Norway spruce (Picea abies), Scots pine (Pinus sylvestris L.), and silver birch 101 
(Betula pendula). Full descriptive statistics of the initial structure and a map of the site location are 102 
provided in Section 1 of the Supplementary Material. 103 
2.2. Forest Management Scenario Modelling 104 
Five scenarios were developed for a period of 37 years from 2013 to 2050. By selecting this 105 
time period we assumed that climate change mitigation impacts are time-bound and require 106 
immediate action. Scenarios were modelled using the stand-level yield and growth simulation 107 
model MOTTI, which is an empirically derived forest stand model using Finnish data (i.e. Hynynen 108 
et al., 2005; Salminen et al. 2005). MOTTI has previously been used for both stand- and landscape-109 
level forest management modeling (i.e. Ahtikoski et al., 2011). Hynynen et al. (2005) provide a 110 
detailed model description. 111 
The five scenarios were: BAU, Bioenergy (ENR), Climate (CLI1), Climate (CLI2), and 112 
Biodiversity (BDI). The BAU followed the Finnish Forestry Development Center’s (TAPIO) 113 
recommended forestry practices (Hyvän metsänhoidon suositukset, 2006). It is considered a 114 
reasonable baseline for current management that should be implemented in practice in Finland 115 
(Yrjölä, 2002). Matthies et al. (2015) have shown previously that, although this BAU scenario was 116 
not economically optimized, it provides a suitable economic baseline. The non-BAU forest 117 
management practices were defined by experts at the University of Helsinki and the Natural 118 
Resources Institute Finland (LUKE). 119 
In the ENR scenario, the aim was to produce bioenergy through a short rotation and a low 120 
investment approach. Regeneration was assumed to be natural, sapling tending and forest thinning 121 
were disregarded, and final harvests occurred when annual biomass growth stabilized or declined 122 
depending on site type. All above-ground forest biomass was used for energy production at thermal 123 
power plants. In CLI1 scenario, higher carbon storage (CS) was achieved through longer rotations 124 
and delayed thinnings. For CLI2 scenario the objective was both higher CS and increased beneficial 125 
albedo-related impacts. This was achieved by changing tree species from Norway spruce to silver 126 
birch (Betula pendula) in stands on fertile and medium fertile site types. Rotation ages for those 127 
deciduous species are shorter and this positively affected the albedo impact of management. 128 
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Additionally, the albedo of silver birch is higher than that of Norway spruce. Higher CS was 129 
reached via longer rotations and delayed thinnings for both species.  The BDI scenario achieved 130 
higher species diversity by favoring deciduous trees in thinnings, increasing coarse woody debris 131 
(CWD) accumulation, and lengthening the rotation (=130 years). The management regimes for each 132 
of the scenarios are provided in Section 1 of the Supplementary Material. 133 
2.3. Ecosystem Service Indicators and Economic Returns Calculations 134 
Six indicators were used for evaluating the level of ES achievement in each of the five forest 135 
management scenarios. Following Matthies et al. (2015), each of the indicators is listed below with 136 
their associated Common International Classification of Ecosystem Services (CICES) classification 137 
and supporting academic literature (CICES, 2013): 138 
1. Net radiative forcing from albedo (RFA) (Regulating service – Climate regulation) 139 
(Anderson et al., 2011) 140 
2. Net additional carbon storage (CS) (Regulating service – Atmospheric composition and 141 
climate regulation) (Canadell and Raupach, 2008) 142 
3. Biodiversity Index Value (BIV)3 (Regulating service – Habitat and gene pool protection) 143 
(Cardinale et al., 2006) 144 
4. Harvested saw log volumes (Provisioning services – Biomass) 145 
5. Harvested pulpwood volumes (Provisioning services – Biomass) 146 
6. Harvested biomass for bioenergy (Provisioning services – Biomass-based energy 147 
sources) 148 
The additionality principle was adopted in accounting for the six indicators over the 37 year 149 
period (Cathcart and Delaney, 2006). Any shifts away from BAU towards alternative management 150 
on the landscape were considered a shift towards management that would not have otherwise 151 
occurred, and the net achievement (measured as a normalized achievement for each indicator) 152 
relative to BAU was accounted for. Net CS was comprised of three carbon pools: short and long-153 
term storage in wood products, and above- and below-ground biomass. RFA was converted into 154 
CO2 equivalent units following Sjølie et al. (2013), and together with net CS, it was used for 155 
calculating the compensation under the climate PES scheme (i.e. Betts, 2000; Bonan, 2008; 156 
Thompson et al., 2009). BIV was originally developed as a biodiversity proxy indicator scorecard 157 
                                                          
3
This proxy variable refers to the aggregated biodiversity conservation potential of a given forest stand. CICES does not 
list biodiversity as an ecosystem service. However, biodiversity represents, in this study, the various ecosystem 
functions and processes that are listed by CICES as ecosystem services. Some of these services include: storm 
protection, lifecycle maintenance, habitat, and gene pool protection (CICES, 2013). 
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value for evaluating biodiversity conservation achievement in the Finnish TNV scheme. Three 158 
primary indicator categories were used in calculating BIV: coarse-woody debris, naturalness, and 159 
spatial characteristics (Primmer et al., 2013). BIV was the basis for determining compensation 160 
levels under the biodiversity PES scheme. Juutinen et al. (2013) and Juutinen and Ollikainen (2010) 161 
provide a full explanation of the scorecard and the TNV bidding processes respectively. Further 162 
explanation of the calculations for the ES indicators is available in Section 2 of the Supplementary 163 
Material.      164 
For calculating the discounted economic returns for a variety of different ES from forest 165 
management, we adopt the Ecosystem Service Expectation Value (ESEV) approach following 166 
Matthies et al. (2015) using eq. (A.1). Those authors have demonstrated how the ESEV can be used 167 
for evaluating the perpetual management for a broader set of monetized ES beyond only 168 
provisioning ES. A discount rate of 3% was used in all calculations and is a commonly applied rate 169 
in boreal forest projects (i.e. Backéus et al., 2006; Pohjola and Valsta, 2007). At the landscape level 170 
for all returns, the return per hectare was calculated using the weighted sum of site type and age 171 
class relative to their respective proportion of the total forested area.  172 
Prices and costs of saw log and pulpwood stumpage and silviculture regimes were based on 173 
average real stumpage and costing data (    ) for the Pirkanmaa region over the period of 2001-174 
2011 (See Section 3 in Supplementary Material) (FSYF, 2011; Statistics Finland, 2012). Costs 175 
varied according to each scenario’s treatments (Table B.1). Pulpwood prices were assumed to 176 
always exceed those of energy wood by 1€ at all points of increase in energy wood prices (Anon., 177 
2007; Heikkilä et al., 2009; Petty and Kärhä, 2011).  178 
In Finland, the biomass energy price received by forest owners was assumed to be equal to the 179 
spot price of coal plus the cost of the required EU ETS offsets for coal-based energy production 180 
following Kallio et al. (2011) (See Eq. (A.2)) (Statistics Finland, 2012). Therefore, at the starting 181 
price for climate PES used in this study, 23         
  
, the subsidies would be         as a 182 
result of shifts in energy provisioning away from the utilization of coal in Finland (Kallio et al., 183 
2011). Based on research regarding future development of energy subsidies by Petty and Kärhä 184 
(2011) and Kallio et al. (2011), the long-term future development of energy wood subsidies in 185 
Finland were considered unknown. 186 
For the climate PES scheme payments, a range of climate change mitigation offset prices from 187 
23, 43, and 63         
  
 were used for comparison. For biodiversity PES scheme payments, data 188 
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from the TNV scheme available for 2003-04 from Juutinen et al. (2013) was used (Detailed pricing 189 
information can be found in Section 3 in the Supplementary Material).  190 
Juutinen et al. (2013), in their evaluation of the same dataset, removed information rents from 191 
the real costs of conservation. Information rents, a portion of the PES payment, represent a socially 192 
inefficient overpayment due to asymmetric information that benefits the forest owner in the bidding 193 
process (i.e. willing to provide the services without payment). Juutinen et al. (2013), to evaluate 194 
social inefficiency in the TNV scheme
4, used two ‘Hartman’ rotation price levels to create an 195 
uncertainty range to better reflect forest owner’s possible amenity values. Hartman rotations exceed 196 
the optimal economic rotation due to a forest owner’s preferences for non-monetary management 197 
objectives. Therefore, Hartman 1 price level (low) in this study represents a lower amenity value 198 
among forest owners than Hartman 2 (medium). We also evaluated the original prices paid in the 199 
TNV scheme that included information rents to provide a third price level.  200 
Additionality of biodiversity provisioning was not considered in the TNV scheme, but was 201 
considered within the biodiversity PES scheme in this paper. This study followed the original TNV 202 
scheme policy of 10 (or 20) year contract lengths and applied it to both the biodiversity and climate 203 
PES schemes for comparison
5
 (Primer et al., 2013). Payments were made at the beginning of each 204 
eligible 10-year period.  205 
2.4. Forest Owner Consultation and Nudging 206 
A stakeholder workshop was conducted at the Hyytiälä Field Station on October 10, 2013. 207 
Forest owners were presented with four stories of how forest management practices, under global 208 
change pressures, might develop in the Hyytiälä region in the next 50 years. The four stories were 209 
based on the five management scenarios. The two climate change scenarios were presented to forest 210 
owners together. Workshop participants were selected on the basis of previously conducted 211 
interviews. 212 
Scientifically valid language understandable to an informed layperson was used. Half of the 213 
forest owners were presented with scenario texts containing original expressions, and half received 214 
nudged versions. Two of the scenario texts, Business-as-usual and Biodiversity, were nudged. The 215 
                                                          
4
 Amenity values are defined here as the tangible or intangible qualities or characteristics of a given set of management 
practices on a forest property that contribute towards human appreciation of cultural, recreational, aesthetic or other 
attributes. 
5
 Juutinen et al. (2014) also found that in managed stands the optimal contract length was 10-20 years and transaction 
costs affected contracting by reducing it only 8%. 
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nudged texts were designed according to findings in cognitive linguistics regarding the effects of 216 
language and framing on target audiences (Fauconnier and Turner, 1998; Lakoff and Johnson, 217 
1999). For example, the terms “up” and “down” are systematically associated with positive and 218 
negative reactions, respectively. 219 
The aim of nudging was to move each sentence in the nudged scenarios toward cognitive 220 
appeal and cognitive optimality by adjusting the researchers’ original expressions into expressions 221 
containing explicit primary metaphors. A primary metaphor is a fundamental unit of language and 222 
thought that connects sensorimotor experience with subjective experience (Lakoff and Johnson, 223 
1999). Cognitive appeal is achieved when a text contains primary metaphors associated with 224 
positive subjective experiences, such as happiness, aﬀection and goodness (Hukkinen, 2012; Lakoﬀ 225 
and Johnson, 1999). Conversely, primary metaphors associated with negative subjective 226 
experiences decrease cognitive appeal. Cognitive optimality measures the ease with which the 227 
human mind can imagine and simulate the text (Fauconnier and Turner, 1998; Hukkinen, 2012). 228 
When a structure of meaning is cognitively optimal, the human mind can “run” it eﬀortlessly in 229 
imaginative mental simulation (Fauconnier and Turner, 1998).  230 
Each text was connected to a brief questionnaire containing six indicators to measure cognitive 231 
appeal and cognitive optimality. The indicators were measured on the Visual Analogue Scale: the 232 
respondents are presented with a continuous line with two qualitatively described endpoints and 233 
asked to indicate which point on the line best characterizes their evaluation of the scenario. The 234 
endpoints are bipolar adjective pairs. The adjectives used for cognitive appeal were (1) “worth 235 
striving for” – “not worth striving for”, (2) “believable” – “unbelievable” and (3) “realistic” – 236 
“unrealistic”; and the indicators for cognitive optimality are (1) “clear” – “unclear”, (2) “consistent” 237 
– “inconsistent” and (3) “feels real” – “feels unreal”. The indicators were used to understand the 238 
two aspects of cognitive attraction (For further explanation and questionnaire results see Section 4 239 
of the Supplementary Material).  240 
2.5. Trade-off and Landscape Management Modelling 241 
Multi-criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) methods are frequently used to evaluate forest 242 
owners’ preferences and non-monetary forest attributes in landscape planning problems (i.e. 243 
Gehlbach, 1975; Munda, 2000; Herath and Prato, 2006). In this study, the trade-offs between 244 
indicator and optimization of the landscape management were both modelled using the “portfolio of 245 
landscape management scenarios” MCDA approach proposed by Mönkkönen et al. (2014).  246 
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Trade-offs were evaluated by modelling for the Pareto optimal solutions, portfolios of 247 
management regimes, for 100 points over the range from minimum to maximum achievement of 248 
total economic returns excluding PES revenues. The resulting trade-offs between ES indicators 249 
were then reported. An optimal portfolio could consist of any of the five management scenarios. 250 
The outcome was non-inferior portfolios with respect to the considered optimization objective 251 
function (total economic returns) and constraints (i.e. site type and age class area constraints, forest 252 
owner’s management preferences). Indicators were scaled to using the zero-one normalization, thus 253 
all indicators will be within the range of zero to ones. This was done to facilitate efficient 254 
comparison of trade-offs between variables where minimum and maximum possible achievement in 255 
each variable can be measured against the others without units. A value of zero was the minimum 256 
possible achievement of a given indicator over all of the considered management scenarios and one 257 
as the maximum achievement (See Jones and Tamiz (2010) for details). 258 
Once the indicators were normalized, synergies in achievement for different ES could then be 259 
evaluated by examining the relationship between trade-off curves (i.e. elasticities, correlations). The 260 
calculation of elasticities and correlations was done following the approach of Mönkkönen et al. 261 
(2014). 262 
In MCDA constraints act as limitations on the attainable decision space. Pareto optimal 263 
solutions constitute the efficient frontier of this space. Attainable solutions lay within the decision 264 
space at and below the frontier. In the evaluation of forest management problems often the frontier 265 
is constrained by private management preferences, and prevents the achievement of socially optimal 266 
levels of ES provisioning. This distance between the frontier and the social optimum represents the 267 
inefficiency that various measures (i.e. targeting, bundling, nudging etc.) aim to minimize. Pareto 268 
optimal solutions were constructed by constraining each starting age class and site type proportional 269 
to the starting forest inventory data. Given that starting inventories were fixed, additional stands of 270 
a given starting age class or site type were not allowed to be part of the optimal solution.  271 
The preferences of the nudged and neutral groups (where nudged and neutral/non-nudged 272 
language was used, respectively) were then incorporated as constraints on the Pareto optimal 273 
landscape management portfolio. They determined the maximum proportion that a given 274 
management scenario could have in the optimal portfolio. An average of the nudged and neutral 275 
forest owners’ management preferences was calculated based on survey responses (Averages are 276 
presented in Table 1). Management preferences were used to evaluate the social efficiency of the 277 
two PES schemes. Efficiency was evaluated on the basis of ES indicator achievement per unit of 278 
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baseline economic return and baseline ES indicator achievement. Baseline was defined as BAU 279 
management over the entire landscape (current management without intervention). To evaluate the 280 
changes from the baseline management case to the nudged and neutral alternatives, a percentage 281 
normalization was used (for details see Jones and Tamiz 2010). Thus, any achievement above 1 282 
indicated an increase in provisioning of that variable above the baseline over the landscape.  283 
 284 
Table 1. Percentage of the forested landscape allocated to the alternative management 285 
regimes for both nudged and neutral (n = 10) forest owner groups. 286 
Forest Owner Group BAU ENR CLI BDI 
Neutral  41.2 11.8 29.4 17.6 
Nudge 25.9 15.6 32.5 26.0 
3. Results  287 
3.1. ES Indicator Trade-off curves and elasticities  288 
The resulting Pareto optimal management solutions for each level of economic return allowed 289 
for an evaluation of the associated trade-offs between ES indicators. In Table 2, regulating services, 290 
including also bioenergy, had a strong negative correlation with economic returns. The inverse 291 
outcome was found for provisioning ES, excluding bioenergy, and economic returns. A reduction in 292 
those two provisioning services, saw logs and pulpwood, resulted in an increase in regulating 293 
services, such as biodiversity conservation, and decrease in economic returns when PES were not 294 
considered. CS had the weakest negative correlation with economic returns. 295 
Table 2. Elasticities and correlations of trade-off between economic returns and all ecosystem 296 
service (ES) indicators.  297 
Ecosystem Service 
Indicator  
Elasticity at different levels of achievement in economic returns (%) Correlation 
with 
Economic 
Returns 
100%   50%   25%   
Point   Point 
Arc   
(100-50) 
Point  
Arc 
(100-25) 
Arc 
(50-25) 
Biodiversity (BIV) -329.35 -1.34 -5.63 -1.05 -2.79 -0.84 -0.97 
Carbon storage (CS)  -329.35 -0.98 -5.63  1.79 -2.79  0.15 -0.76 
Albedo Effect (RFA)  -329.35 -1.07 -5.63  1.28 -2.79 -0.05 -0.84 
Saw timber harvest  -329.35 -0.50 -5.63 -2.31 -2.79 -0.44  0.95 
Pulpwood harvest  -329.93 -1.94 -5.63 -2.73 -2.79 -1.53  1.00 
Bioenergy harvest  -329.35 -1.77 -5.63  0.44 -2.79 -0.59 -0.90 
a. 100% indicates that elasticity was calculated for the first two Pareto optimal solutions along the trade-off curve at 100% of income without 
PES revenues. 
b. 50%  indicates that elasticity was calculated for the first two Pareto optimal solutions along the trade-off curve at 50% of income without PES 
revenues. 
c. 25%  indicates that elasticity was calculated for the first two Pareto optimal solutions along the trade-off curve at 25% of income without PES 
revenues. 
d. Point refers to the point elasticity at a given point along the trade-off curve. 
e. Arc refers to the arc elasticity at a given arc segment along the trade-off curve. 
 
Elasticity gives the proportional  change in one variable related to a change in another. 298 
Evaluating the elasticities of the trade-off curves provided a basis for determining if marginal shifts 299 
in economic returns led to adverse marginal changes for a given ES indicator. Moving from the first 300 
Pareto optimum to the second was the most expensive shift, largest reduction in economic returns 301 
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versus all ES indicators, relative to all other Pareto optimum shifts (Table 2). The first Pareto 302 
optimum in this study consisted of landscape-wide adoption of the BAU scenario (current 303 
management). Subsequent Pareto shifts were less expensive. Additional provisioning of sawn 304 
timber and pulpwood was always negative for all subsequent Pareto optima relative to the first 305 
solution (See Fig. B.3 in Supplementary Material). 306 
Without the inclusion of compensation for shifts in management, the trade-off between 307 
economic returns and regulating ES indicators meant that the maximum possible achievement in the 308 
ES indicators did not occur without a large reduction in the economic returns. The optimal 309 
achievement (100%) in CS and RFA was located at a 41% and 36% achievement in economic 310 
returns (excluding PES). The two climate change mitigation indicators had a strong positive intra-311 
curve correlation (0.99); indicating a strong complementarity in co-provisioning these ES. 312 
Maximum BIV was achieved at a 91% reduction in economic returns (excluding PES). Although 313 
maximum achievement in BIV is not realized at the same level of economic returns, there are still 314 
strong potential synergies between all three regulating ES (Fig. 1). 315 
Fig 1. Trade-off curves for carbon storage (CS) and avoided radiative forcing from the albedo 316 
effect (RFA) against Biodiversity Index Value (BIV). Indicators were normalized using a zero-one 317 
normalization scheme to compare indicator achievement. Achievement was measured based on additionality relative to 318 
baseline management (BAU).  319 
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 320 
Intra-ES elasticities were also considered (Table 3). Elasticities between provisioning ES and 321 
regulating ES were always inelastic (negative). Negative elasticities indicate a win-lose trade-off 322 
between the two ES; a marginal increase in one ES results in a marginal decrease in another. 323 
Positive elasticities represent ‘elastic’ provisioning and a win-win trade-off; marginal increases in 324 
both ES. When RFA was evaluated relative to BIV, then the starting point elasticity, moving from 325 
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the first Pareto optimum to the second, was -4.28. This diminished to -1.74 moving from the second 326 
to third Pareto optimum, which was the same point elasticity as the elasticity of the first two Pareto 327 
optima between CS and BIV. Therefore, the first increments of increased climate change mitigation 328 
were expensive in terms of lost biodiversity conservation. At 100% of maximum achievement in 329 
BIV, CS achievement was 77% and RFA was 83%.  330 
Perfect inelasticity, indicating that shifting management will not result in an increase or 331 
decrease in the provisioning of either ES, between RFA and BIV was reached at 100% of maximum 332 
RFA achievement and 50% of BIV achievement. The correlation between these two variables was 333 
moderately positive (0.53). The relationship between CS and BIV at the same levels of 334 
achievement; the two indicators were moderately positively correlated (0.51).   335 
Table 3. Elasticities and correlations for trade-off curves of carbon storage (CS) and avoided 336 
radiative forcing from the albedo effect (RFA) against Biodiversity Index Value (BIV). 337 
Comparative 
Ecosystem Service 
Indicator 
Elasticity at different levels of BIV achievement (%) 
Correlation 
with BIV 
100%   50%   25%   
Point   Point 
Arc   
(100-50) 
Point  
Arc 
(100-25) 
Arc 
(50-25) 
Carbon storage (CS)  -1.74 -0.05 -0.28 -0.22 0.04 0.10 0.51 
Albedo Effect (RFA)  -4.28  0.00 -0.21 -0.12 0.02 0.07 0.53 
a. 100% of BIV indicates that this is the elasticity of the first two Pareto optimal solutions along the curve. 
b. 50% of BIV indicates that this is the elasticity of the two Pareto optimal solutions at the midpoint of the curve. 
c. 25% of BIV indicates that this is the elasticity of the two Pareto optimal solutions at the point where 25% of biodiversity conservation 
is achieved. 
d. Point refers to the point elasticity at a given point along the trade-off curve. 
e. Arc refers to the arc elasticity at a given arc segment along the trade-off curve. 
 338 
3.2. Payment for Ecosystem Services 339 
When PES were excluded, the ESEV values were highest overall for the BAU scenario and the 340 
shift towards increased management for silver birch, to increase RFA, resulted in higher returns in 341 
scenario CLI2 over CLI1 (See Table B.8 in the Supplementary Materials). Including climate PES 342 
and provisioning service revenues led to incrementally increasing ESEV values over the range of 343 
climate PES prices for each of CLI1, CLI2, and BDI. At the highest climate PES price, BAU 344 
returns also increased due to the high prices’ influence on pulpwood prices. Under the biodiversity-345 
based PES scheme, ESEV values indicated the importance of calculating the amenity value of 346 
biodiversity-related management for forest owners.  Including information rents led to much higher 347 
ESEV results for the CLI1, CLI2 and BDI scenarios. There is no change for BAU or ENR due to no 348 
additional service provisioning. 349 
3.3. Nudging forest owners’ landscape management preferences  350 
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Overall, owners for both nudged and neutral groups accepted a loss in provisioning service 351 
income and a gain in regulating ES relative to the current BAU. The difference in lost ESEV was 352 
more pronounced for the nudged group relative to the neutral group at low PES price levels and 353 
when PES were excluded. This difference decreased as prices increased from medium to high prices 354 
under the biodiversity PES scheme (-1.4 to -2.5% reduction below neutral owners and -7.4 to -3.5% 355 
of baseline ESEV) and climate PES scheme (-3.9 to -1.7% reduction below neutral owners and to 356 
+4.9 to +24.1% above the baseline ESEV) (Table 4).  357 
Juutinen et al. (2013) noted that asymmetrical information due to information rent-seeking 358 
behavior by forest owners in the TNV bidding process resulted in an overpayment to forest owners. 359 
When the same BIV pricing data was applied to compensate for the opportunity costs of additional 360 
ES provisioning (above BAU management), then the achievement of economic returns under the 361 
biodiversity PES scheme relative to the baseline never exceeds 1 (Table 4).  362 
 363 
Table 4. Normalized achievement of carbon storage (CS), avoided radiative forcing from the 364 
albedo effect (RFA), Biodiversity Index Value (BIV), and total economic returns relative to 365 
Business-as-Usual management baseline for nudged and neutral forest owners’ preference 366 
constraints under biodiversity and climate-based PES schemes when economic returns were 367 
maximized. For economic returns, a value exceeding 1 represents an overpayment beyond the costs of conservation. 368 
For ES indicators, a value exceeding 1 represents increased achievement in provisioning additional to the BAU at the 369 
landscape level. 370 
Ecosystem 
Service 
Indicators 
Forest Owner 
Group 
Economic Returns Scenarios 
Excluding 
PES 
Including Biodiversity PES 
(€ BIV-1) 
Including Climate PES  
          
    
Hartman 1 Hartman 2 
Info. Rent 
Included 
23 43 63 
Economic Returns 
Neutral  0.796  0.799  0.940  0.988  0.920  1.088  1.258 
Nudge  0.642  0.700  0.926  0.963  0.864  1.049  1.241 
Nudge Difference -0.154 -0.099 -0.014 -0.025 -0.056 -0.039 -0.017 
Biodiversity 
(BVI ha
-1
) 
Neutral  1.095  1.097  1.178  1.166  1.150  1.148  1.151 
Nudge  1.115  1.141  1.222  1.177  1.150  1.133  1.168 
Nudge Difference  0.020  0.044  0.044  0.011  0.000 -0.015  0.017 
Carbon storage 
(CS) (C kg ha
-1
) 
Neutral  1.230  1.113  1.219  1.260  1.249  1.246  1.276 
Nudge  1.113  1.215  1.294  1.299  1.295  1.345  1.339 
Nudge Difference -0.117  0.102  0.075  0.039  0.046  0.099  0.063 
Albedo Effect 
(RFA)  
(W ha
-1
 1E+10
-1
) 
Neutral  1.012  1.007  1.010  1.012  1.012  1.012  1.013 
Nudge  1.007  1.012  1.013  1.015  1.014  1.017  1.016 
Nudge Difference -0.005  0.005  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.005  0.003 
Aggregated ES 
Indicators 
Neutral  1.112  1.072  1.136  1.146  1.137  1.135  1.147 
Nudge  1.078  1.123  1.176  1.164  1.153  1.165  1.174 
Nudge Difference -0.034  0.050  0.041  0.018  0.016  0.030  0.028 
 371 
Table 4 shows that greater achievement in all regulating ES indicators for the nudged group, 372 
relative to the baseline management, was positive and above 1 (except for BIV at a climate PES 373 
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price of 43         
  
) when economic returns were maximized under increasing prices for both 374 
PES schemes. The same result was found when comparing between nudged and neutral groups.  375 
Nudged results were almost always higher and positive, but increasing PES scheme prices led to 376 
higher decreases in the marginal increased benefits from nudging. Aggregate regulating ES 377 
indicator achievement was higher in the climate PES scheme, but achievement in BIV was higher 378 
and more equitably realized compared to CS and RFA under the biodiversity PES scheme. The 379 
higher achievement under the climate PES scheme was the result of increases in CS and RFA that 380 
exceeded the loss in BIV achievement.  381 
In Table 5, the landscape level ESEV, realized under optimization, relative to the baseline 382 
management ESEV divided by the aggregated regulating ES indicator achievement, reported in 383 
Table 4, relative to the baseline management ES achievement is calculated. The ratio demonstrates 384 
the environmental benefit per unit of income. Although aggregated ES provisioning decreases for 385 
the nudged group relative to the neutral group as price levels increase in Table 4, the environmental 386 
benefits remained higher and positive relative to the neutral group in Table 5. 387 
Table 5. Social efficiency of environmental benefits for both nudged and neutral preference 388 
groups for both Payment for Ecosystem Service (PES) schemes and all associated price levels.  389 
PES Scheme Price Level 
Forest 
Owner 
Group 
Economic Returns 
(Normalized) 
Aggregated 
ES 
Achievement  
Ratio of ES per 
Economic 
Return 
Excluding PES 
Schemes 
 
Neutral 0.796 1.112 1.397 
Nudge 0.642 1.078 1.679 
Biodiversity PES 
Scheme 
(€ BIV-1 ha-1) 
Hartman 1 
Neutral 0.799 1.072 1.342 
Nudge 0.700 1.123 1.604 
Hartman 2  
Neutral 0.940 1.136 1.209 
Nudge 0.926 1.176 1.270 
Info. Rents 
Included  
Neutral 0.988 1.146 1.160 
Nudge 0.963 1.164 1.209 
Climate PES 
Scheme 
          
      ) 
23 
Neutral 0.920 1.137 1.236 
Nudge 0.864 1.153 1.334 
43 
Neutral 1.088 1.135 1.043 
Nudge 1.049 1.165 1.111 
63 
Neutral 1.258 1.147 0.912 
Nudge 1.241 1.174 0.946 
 390 
4. Discussion 391 
Our results indicate that a shift away from BAU management, when compensation is not 392 
provided, results in an economic loss for forest owners. Mönkkönen et al. (2014) noted in their 393 
similar study about the costs of biodiversity conservation in Finland, that there is a negative trade-394 
off relationship between conservation and economic objectives. This trade-off also exists in this 395 
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study, and corresponds to the high initial cost of increased conservation due to the reduction in 396 
income from decreases in provisioning ES. The two PES schemes for biodiversity conservation and 397 
climate change mitigation were aimed to address the economic loss experienced by forest owners in 398 
a socially efficient manner.  399 
By looking at the reported trade-offs and elasticities, it is possible to better estimate opportunity 400 
costs of management shifts and create more socially efficient compensation schemes. The 401 
complementary interactions between management for different regulating ES provide an 402 
opportunity for improving the efficiency of schemes targeted at specific ES. Synergies between 403 
management for RFA and BIV were higher than those between CS and BIV. This was due to the 404 
increased percentage of deciduous tree species in the stand structures of the CLI and BDI scenarios 405 
that were used to achieve increases in both indicators. However, there were also divergent 406 
management activities (i.e. harvesting, thinnings) that were adopted, which reduced the 407 
complementarity between RFA and BIV. These included: early harvesting, to support changes in 408 
avoided albedo-related impacts, and thinnings. The revenues from those management interventions 409 
resulted in CS and RFA being relatively less expensive, in terms of the associated opportunity costs 410 
(lost provisioning service revenues), when compared to biodiversity conservation.  411 
As a result of these intra-service trade-off dynamics, biodiversity objectives were found to be 412 
more sensitive to shifts away from biodiversity-based management than climate change mitigation 413 
objectives were to shifts away from climate-based management. Thus, shifting preferences among 414 
forest owners away from biodiversity management by targeting management for other regulating 415 
ES through a PES scheme could increase the environmental cost of that scheme. In this study, 416 
incentivizing biodiversity conservation management, through a biodiversity-based PES scheme, 417 
resulted in more equitable achievement between regulating ES than under the climate PES scheme. 418 
Care should be taken in designing PES schemes targeting a specific ES or set of ES, so that 419 
management actions required to achieve the schemes objectives do not result in environmentally 420 
costly outcomes. The differing management practices that are necessary to achieve socially efficient 421 
levels of non-complimentary ES provisioning indicates the importance of evaluating intra-service 422 
trade-offs during PES scheme design. Thus, schemes should be designed to incentivize management 423 
actions that achieve the prescribed objectives without creating adverse trade-offs with other vital 424 
ES.  425 
The bundling or stacking of multiple ES within a single PES scheme is one approach to address 426 
this challenge in a socially efficient manner (Turner et al., 2014). The goal of stacking ES is to 427 
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reduce the risk of adverse intra-service trade-offs, which is done by incentivizing the co-428 
provisioning ES. Currently, PES schemes for climate change mitigation and biodiversity 429 
conservation in Finland are voluntary, and stacking ES is not common. However, stacking various 430 
ES in a singular scheme could act to decrease marginal service provisioning costs to society per unit 431 
of service provided. In our study, we have stacked CS and RFA into a climate-based PES scheme 432 
due to the high correlation noted in Section 3.1, and the co-provisioning complementarity between 433 
these two ES. Our results suggest that, in the case of boreal forests, further stacking of biodiversity 434 
conservation and climate change mitigation objectives is possible. This could be achieved if 435 
appropriate care is taken to determine those management interventions that are complimentary to 436 
achieving the correct balance between equitable and aggregate achievement of the desired 437 
outcomes.  438 
As noted earlier, preferences of forest owners should also, along with intra-ES trade-offs, 439 
inform the policy-makers to reduce social inefficiencies and environmental costs. Offering 440 
payments that are insufficiently high to incentivize adoption of socially-optimal land uses, 441 
incentivizing adoption at a higher cost to society than the ES are worth, or paying for management 442 
practices that would have already been adopted all constitute inefficiencies in PES policy 443 
development (Pagiola, 2005; Pagiola and Platais, 2007; Engel et al., 2008).  444 
Engel et al., (2008) suggest that targeting those service providers with lower policy costs, based 445 
on current preferences, is one means of reducing inefficiencies within a PES scheme. Still, if long 446 
term shifts in preferences for larger groups of forest owners could be attained, then further 447 
efficiency gains in PES schemes could be achieved. One tool that could be used to make these gains 448 
is nudging service providers by framing differently the way in which they are consulted. 449 
Additionally, there are various implementation challenges associated with PES schemes: free-450 
ridership, coordination when bundling multiple ES, connectivity of land use management units over 451 
the landscape, and overall costs of management (Engel et al., 2008; Ferraro, 2011; Broch et al., 452 
2013). Nudging service providers could address these challenges by reducing the need to seek out 453 
specific land owners. Increased size and connectivity of nudged service providers could reduce 454 
monitoring and transaction costs for scheme administration, and allow for targeting of specific 455 
geographical areas rather than specific individuals. 456 
Nudging was explored in this study as a potential tool for improving how service providers are 457 
consulted and the related social efficiency gains for PES schemes. The sample size in this study was 458 
small, and is of course not representative. However, these results were, in 2014, cross-checked with 459 
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two other samples (n=68 and n=46, respectively), testing the effect of the same set of scenarios. The 460 
results from a statistical analysis of all sets indicated that the trends observed in the Hyytiälä 461 
workshop data are robust enough to justify their use in the context of the current paper.  462 
The environmental benefits noted, when owners were nudged under both PES schemes and all 463 
price levels, provide an important starting point for future research. The marginal environmental 464 
benefit per unit ESEV was always higher for the nudged group in comparison to the neutral group. 465 
Also, total ES achievement was higher for the nudged group for all PES schemes and price levels. 466 
Both of the consulted groups, nudged and neutral, gave higher than baseline levels of provisioning 467 
based on their forest management preference constraints. This indicates that even when forest 468 
owners were not nudged, consulting them about alternative management objectives led to stated 469 
preferences that were different from the baseline forest management (BAU).  470 
Previous studies have noted that forest owner’s preferences for ES provisioning can differ 471 
spatially, which can then act as a constraint on the connectivity of ES provisioning by different 472 
owners (Wilson et al., 2007; Broch et al., 2013). Wilson et al. (2007) note that, especially in the 473 
case of  biodiversity conservation, connectivity in ES provisioning can be important for addressing 474 
ES ‘hot spots’. Thus, targeting specific providers based on their value structures may not be an 475 
efficient means of addressing those provisioning challenges. Nudging forest owners could have 476 
important implications for the spatial design of the PES schemes, which aim to target ES 477 
provisioning from specific geographical areas. 478 
The climate PES scheme had higher aggregate achievement in ES for both the nudged and 479 
neutral groups, but more equitable provisioning of all regulating ES was achieved under the 480 
biodiversity PES scheme. On this basis, the biodiversity PES scheme came closer to a socially 481 
efficient payment at the price levels that were paid in the TNV scheme, including information rents, 482 
and the climate scheme was closer under the lowest price level. Taking this result in conjunction 483 
with the intra-service trade-off analysis, the biodiversity PES scheme led to less adverse intra-484 
service trade-offs and more holistic ES provisioning.    485 
Despite the potential benefits of nudging, there some limitations, in the context of PES schemes, 486 
that need to be addressed by future research. We have incorporated the nudging effect as weighted 487 
averages of management preferences across the landscape. In the stakeholder workshop, however, it 488 
became clear that the forest owners were inclined to apply a mixture of management approaches. A 489 
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more robust evaluation of the nudging effect would be obtained by testing the influence on owner 490 
preferences of different framings of specific combinations of stand level management scenarios.  491 
It was not possible to include dynamic timber stumpage pricing, in response to increasing PES 492 
pricing within the model, within our model. This led to higher marginal environmental benefits and 493 
decreasing aggregated ES provisioning for the nudged group relative to the neutral group as PES 494 
price levels increased. Evaluation of the social efficiency of nudging requires that marginal 495 
environmental benefits per monetary unit of expenditure (PES payment) are reduced relative to the 496 
baseline (neutral group). However, within the structure of this study increasing PES prices and 497 
concurrently maximizing economic returns led to a seeming socially inefficient outcome, in terms 498 
of regulating ES provisioning per unit of return, between the nudged and neutral groups. Future 499 
research should include a more dynamic means of account for market effects on provisioning price 500 
levels.  501 
Selinger and Powys Whyte (2010) and Burgess (2012) have also questioned the role and 502 
effectiveness of nudging as a policy tool to evaluate stakeholder’s long-term preferences; especially 503 
outside of a laboratory environment. They note that Level 3 nudges, those nudges looking at 504 
complex global problems like climate change, have received limited recognition so far and produce 505 
emergent behavior that can be extremely difficult to predict (Allenby and Sarewitz, 2011; Selinger 506 
and Powys Whyte, 2012). These questions need to be explored further. 507 
Finally, it is important to note that these results were calculated under the assumption of there 508 
would be no major shifts in the environmental conditions for forest management over the next 37 509 
years. We also did not create a scenario where major shifts in long-term storage in wood products 510 
were considered. Both of these outcomes are possible, but it was necessary to create scenarios that 511 
were not overly complex for consulting with forest owners. 512 
5. Conclusions 513 
This study demonstrates the potential for reducing policy costs by nudging forest owners’ 514 
preferences. Reducing the social and environmental costs of PES schemes by nudging land owners 515 
could have important implications for how PES schemes are designed and stakeholder engagement 516 
is structured. This can lead to greater preference for higher additional service provisioning. Nudging 517 
reduced the cost per unit of service provided and increased the total service provision by land 518 
owners. As a result, the marginal costs of ES provision could be decreased for society; increasing 519 
the efficiency of PES schemes. Many of these gains are a result of synergies in managing for 520 
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different regulating ES. Higher synergies were found under biodiversity-based management than 521 
climate mitigation-based management. Therefore, management incentives in PES schemes should 522 
be carefully constructed. Nudging service providers’ preferences provides many possibilities for 523 
reducing social inefficiencies of PES schemes, but also raises new questions about the associated 524 
benefits, permanence and transaction costs. Future research is needed to determine the extent that 525 
this policy tool can be used in the development of more effective and efficient PES schemes.  526 
Appendix A. 527 
         
 
        
        
 
        
      
 
        
   
 
         
 (A.1) 528 
 529 
For discounting the perpetuity of a given stand management regime let   = regeneration costs occurred at the year 0,    530 
= net harvest income at year t,    = all non-timber revenues occurring at time t,    = all non-timber costs occurring at 531 
time t,   = time when revenue or cost occurs,   = is the time period of perpetual future rotations after the initial standing 532 
timber is harvested, and   = real discount rate. 533 
                                                      (A.2) 534 
For calculating the biomass energy price based on the prices of carbon offsets and coal spot prices. Here the        is 535 
the carbon emissions offset price,              is the emissions factor of              
  ,          is the long-term 536 
real spot price of coal assuming no real price growth and 0.722 is a constant representing the calorific value of one 537 
cubic meter of wood chips       and is used to convert the price to       (Irish Energy Centre, 2000; Finnish 538 
Energy Industries, 2012). 539 
Appendix B. Supplementary Material 540 
Supplementary Material for this article can be found online. 541 
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